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NEMEROFF v. ABELSON, BAD FAITH,
AND AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
With the recent dramatic expansion of the caseload of the
federal district courts,' judges now more than ever must take firm
action to deter the litigation of unfounded claims and defenses,
which is sapping both public and private legal resources. A time-
honored tool for this task is the "bad faith" exception to the Ameri-
can Rule that each party pays its own attorneys' fees.2  This excep-
tion allows a judge to assign a reasonable amount of the prevailing
party's fees to the losing party when he finds that the loser has
initiated or conducted the litigation in bad faith.8
I Overall, the number of cases pending at the end of the year rose from 93,207
in 1970 to 166,462 in 1978; the pending load per judgeship rose from 232 to 417
cases during that period. [1978] AD. OFF. UNITED STATES COURTS Din. ANN. B1EP.
104-05. The last few years have seen a spate of articles in mass-circulation maga-
zines and newspapers concerning the growing volume of litigation in this country
and its potentially harmful effects on society. See, e.g., Footlick, Too Much Law?,
NEWsWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 42; Pike, Why Everybody is Suing Everybody, U.S.
NEws & Woar.D REP., Dec. 4, 1978, at 50; Those #*xll Lawyers, TIm, Apr. 10,
1978, at 56.
2 The American Rule was first articulated in 1796 in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796), and has been unequivocally supported by the Supreme
Court ever since. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714 (1967); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880); Stewart v. Sonneborn,
98 U.S. 187 (1879); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872). In
Alyeska, the most significant recent case on the subject, the Court discussed the
history of the rule at some length. The rule is generally supported on two grounds:
that it would be unfair to penalize an honest litigant merely for bringing a claim
or offering a defense; and that to hold a party liable for the victor's legal fees
would unjustly deter the poor from vindicating their rights in the courts. Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718.
In contrast to the American Rule, the general rule in Great Britain and most
other western countries is that the losing party pays the attorneys' fees of the
prevailing party. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as
an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619, 619-21 (1931); Stoebuck, Counsel
Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202, 204-07
(1966). For a brief discussion of the British rule by the United States Supreme
Court, see Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 717 (1966).
3 Such "fee shifting" under the bad faith exception is limited to those ex-
penses that the prevailing party has reasonably incurred to meet the bad faith
claims or defenses of his opponent. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA
Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1089 (2d Cir. 1977). For discussions of what fees are
"reasonable," see Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?,
126 U. PA. L. REv. 281 (1977); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and
Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 701-13 (1974).
In reaffirming the American Rule, the Alyeska Court also reiterated its sup-
port of the bad faith exception: "a court may assess attorneys' fees . . . when the
losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea-
sons . . . .' These exceptions are unquestionably assertions of inherent power in
the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Con-
gress ... ." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
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The recent case of Nemeroff v. Abelson 4 appears to represent
one attempt to put more "bite" into the bad faith exception for
deterrent purposes. Judge Carter's decision, however, points up
the need to consider squarely what procedural requirements and
safeguards of fairness are or should be triggered by invocation of
the exception. Courts have devoted little overt attention to these
matters, and commentators have tended to concentrate on attacking
the American Rule as a whole 5 rather than on making suggestions
for its improvement.
This Comment first analyzes the Nemeroff opinion and related
case law in order to explore the nature of the prerequisites for
shifting attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception. 6 Second, the
Comment discusses a crucial question raised but not expressly ad-
dressed in the Nemeroff opinion: what type of proof is required to
establish that a claim was brought with improper motive? 7 More
precisely, may a court simply infer improper motive from the evi-
dence adduced to support the claim or from the party's conduct
during the litigation, or must an evidentiary hearing into motive
be conducted if desired by either party? The Comment concludes
that a party should be given time to discover and present evidence
directly bearing on the state of mind of the litigant against whom
fees are sought. Although such an opportunity should always be
provided before an award of attorneys' fees is granted or denied,
procedures are recommended that will obviate the need for a full-
(1975) (citations omitted). For earlier decisions confirming the exception, see
F.D. Rich Co. v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4
(1968). For a general discussion of the exception, and especially its applicability
to state court systems, see Comment, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith
Exception, 29 HAsn-cs LJ. 319, 332 (1977). See also Court Awarded Attorney's
Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, supra, at 689-92.
4469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May
25, 1979).
5 See, e.g., Ehrzenweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great So-
ciety, 54 CALr. L. REv. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fees: Why Not a
Cost of LitigationP, 49 IowA L. REv. 75 (1963); McCormick, supra note 2; Stoe-
buck, supra note 2; Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, supra note 3, at 648-55. See also note 130 infra.
6 There are two general applications of the bad faith exception; only the first
is discussed in this Comment. The first concerns bad faith in the litigation itself,
including pressing a suit or defense for an improper purpose. The second comes
into play when the court finds that the obdurate obstinacy of the defendant forced
the plaintiff to resort to the courts to vindicate legal claims of unquestionable
validity. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978); Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Huecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir.
1976); Richardson v. Communications Workers of America, 530 F.2d 126 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
7 The question of motive is the third and last stage of analysis in the applica-
tion of the bad faith exception. See text accompanying notes 22-27 infra.
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scale trial-like hearing in every case. Finally, this Comment sug-
gests that the inescapable procedural costs of a rule that requires
subjective bad faith may provide one more argument for abandon-
ing the American Rule altogether in favor of a regime of routine
fee shifting, aimed at compensation rather than punishment, in
cases involving groundless claims.
I. Nemeroff v. A belson
Dr. Robert Nemeroff invested heavily in the stock of Techni-
care Corporation. After a spectacular rise, the stock dropped slightly
in price-just around the time Alan Abelson published several ar-
ticles critical of the stock in Barron's National Business and Finan-
cial Weekly." Nemeroff then filed suit against Abelson, the
editor and the publisher of Barron's, and certain short sellers 9 of
Technicare stock, alleging that Abelson had leaked word of those
forthcoming negative columns on Technicare to the sellers in viola-
tion of sections 9 (a) and 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.10 Several months after the complaint was filed, it was amended
to charge that the short sellers had solicited Abelson to write nega-
tive stories about Technicare.11
About ten months after the initial complaint was filed, Judge
Carter granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the action voluntarily
with prejudice.12 The dismissal was to be effective after an interim
period during which the defendants had leave to and did file
a motion for attorneys' fees on the basis of plaintiff's alleged bad
faith in bringing the action.13 After hearing oral argument on the
legal issues raised by the motion, the court found that the suit had
been filed in bad faith as against the publishing defendants, but not
as against the defendant short sellers, and ordered Nemeroff and
his attorneys to pay a substantial portion of the publishing defend-
ants' legal expenses.14
8 Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979). The articles appeared in Abelson's regu-
larly published column, "Up and Down Wall Street." Id.
9 Short sellers are those who agree to sell stock they do not yet own at a
future date for a set price, in the hope that they will be able to acquire the stock
before that date at a lower price. Thus, short sellers stand to make money in a
falling market, but risk losing money if the market rises.
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a), 78j(b) (1976).
11Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 632 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
12 Id.
1Id.
14No attorneys' fees were awarded to the short sellers. The basis for this
distinction between defendants was that while the potential for damage to the
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Substantial disputes arose in Nemeroff regarding the precise
nature of the pre- and post-complaint investigation into the alleged
wrongdoings. The court fixed most of its attention on the amount
of information the plaintiff's attorneys had been able to gather to
verify their claims before they filed suit. 5 Judge Carter found that
the plaintiff's investigation had turned up very little evidence that
would be "admissible in this case," and that what admissible evi-
dence there was would not be very helpful in substantiating his
claims.16 On the other hand, it was undisputed that plaintiff's
attorney had investigated the claim; this was not a case in which
the attorneys merely listened to the client's allegations and immedi-
ately commenced litigation on that basis alone. An experienced
attorney with the Boston law firm of Hale and DolT interviewed
potential witnesses, gathered documents bearing on the buying pat-
terns of the short sellers in relation to the publication dates of
Abelson's columns, obtained information on social relationships
between the short sellers and the publishing defendants, and fol-
lowed up a magazine article that had alleged a similar scheme by
the publishing defendants to drive down the price of another cor-
poration.
7
It is apparent that the court based its finding of bad faith in
regard to the publishing defendants largely on what it considered
to be the inadmissible and irrelevant nature of the evidence that the
plaintiff's attorneys possessed at the time the complaint was with-
drawn. "To make and disseminate allegations such as those made
here without the slightest assurance that plaintiff's burden of proof
could be met, when it is known or should have been known that no
hard facts but only rumor and gossip support the charges," the judge
reputations of the publishing defendants was very great-because of their roles as
analysts and purveyors of information in the investment community-id. 639-40,
the potential for harm to the short sellers as a result of the plaintiff's "baseless"
allegations was virtually nonexistent, because the complaint would only enhance
their reputations as "discerning and skillful speculators," id. 641.
The widespread application of the historical standard of bad faith is made
clear in Judge Carter's statement that
[t]he ultimate question concerning taxing of attorneys' fees and expenses
as costs against plaintiff and/or his counsel under [FED. R. Civ. P. 11;
§ 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976)]
or the court's equitable power is whether the plaintiff and/or counsel
instituted the action "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppres-
sive reasons."
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 637 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No.
79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979) (citations omitted).
15 For Judge Carter's detailed narrative of the investigation, see id. 633-35.
16 Id. 639.
'7 Id. 633-35, 637 n.5.
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chided, "constitutes the essence of bad faith." 18 Having drawn
sweeping inferences regarding plaintiff's motive from examining
this evidence, Judge Carter proceeded to interpret the premature
"leakage" of the complaint to a newspaper as intentional and ma-
licious.19 He did so without benefit of having heard the parties
present and test evidence directly related to the issue of plaintiff's
motive.2 0  And even so, plaintiff's counsel may not have had suf-
ficient notice that material issues of fact concerning the institution
of the suit were to be addressed and resolved through briefing and
oral argument. Under such circumstances, Judge Carter's conclu-
sions seem hastily drawn:
[P]laintiff and his counsel knowingly proceeded with litiga-
tion that lacked foundation. Clearly, the purpose could
not have been to litigate on the merits. Indeed, the only
rational inference to be drawn is that plaintiff's and his
counsel's real objective was the public airing of the dam-
aging allegations against the publishing defendants-an
objective achieved with the filing of the complaint.
2 1
In sum, Judge Carter did make a finding that the plaintiff had
brought the suit in subjective bad faith, but his finding was based
purely on "rational inferences" without an independent, pro-
cedurally fair factual determination of the plaintiff's motive.
II. Ti-E ELEMENTS OF BAD FAITH LITIGATION
Analysis of the case law indicates, as the Nemeroff opinion
states, 22 that three elements must be present in order for a court
to grant a motion to award fees under the bad faith exception.
First, the movant must be the prevailing party.23 Second, the claim
18 Id. 640.
19 Id. 635.
20 See note 102 infra & accompanying text.
21Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 636 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
2 2 See notes 23, 24 & 27 infra.
23 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(1975); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 641 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979). The rationale for the prevailing-party
requirement is closely linked to the second element of the bad faith exception, see
text accompanying note 25 infra: a claim cannot be without merit if the opponent
is not able to defeat it. For a discussion of the difficulty of determining whether
or not a party has prevailed, including consideration of cases in which a claim is
voluntarily withdrawn, see Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. at 641-42.
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or defense provoking the motion must be unfounded, 2a or even
"entirely without color" 25 or "wholly without foundation." 2 6
Third, the claim or defense must have been lodged with a bad mo-
tive, such as harassment. 27  The purpose of this Comment is to
explore the nature of the second and third requirements in an
effort to emphasize the distinction between them and to encourage
courts to avoid blurring that distinction.
A. The Lack of Foundation of the Claim or Defense
If the court decides that a claim or defense is unfounded-
the second requirement for granting a motion for fees under the
bad faith exception-the focus of the inquiry shifts to the critical
issue of motive, or purpose.28 However, if the court finds that the
claim was not unfounded, the fee-shifting motion must be denied,
and an inquiry into motive becomes irrelevant. 29 Thus, except
when the bona fides of conduct at trial are challenged,30 the bad
faith exception generally is inapplicable to cases in which a trial
has been conducted and a verdict rendered, because the necessity of a
full trial suggests that the claim had at least some merit. The
analysis and conclusions set forth in this Comment will usually be
restricted, therefore, to lawsuits that are not fully tried.31
24 Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631, 637 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630,
633 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979). See 6
MooRE's FED rRAL I cTiCE ff 54.77[2], at 1709 (2d ed. 1979).
25 Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088
(2d Cir. 1977).
2
6In re Slodov, [1979] FED. TAxEs (P-H) (43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-961) 79-499,
at 79-968 (N.D. Ohio).
2
'(Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1972); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp.
630, 633, 640 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979);
Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d
Cir. 1977).
28 See text accompanying notes 40-56 infra.
29The court in Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d
1078 (2d Cir. 1977), stated that "[a]n action is brought in bad faith when the
claim is entirely without color and has been asserted wantonly, for purposes of
harassment or delay, or for other improper reasons." Id. 1088 (emphasis added).
The conjunctive formulation implies that if either one of the conditions is not
fulfilled, the motion must be denied. The importance of this point lies in the
very real possibility that a colorable legal claim may be pressed for purposes other
than those usually recognized as "proper."
30 See note 40 infra.
31 Occasionally, a court may exercise its discretion to award fees under the
common law bad faith exception after a full trial on the plaintiff's claim. However,
because the court has observed the parties' testimony and demeanor during trial
and perhaps heard the defendant put the question of plaintiff's motive into issue,
a post-trial finding of malice is not usually subject to the same procedural deficiencies
that a pre-trial finding of bad faith is. See, e.g., Copeland v. Martinez, 435 F.
Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd, 603 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
1979]
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Acknowledging the foregoing scheme, Judge Carter found the
litigation in Nemeroff unfounded "because plaintiff's attorney knew
or should have known that the gossip which he recited in his
affidavit is not evidentiary proof." 32 The plaintiff's motive in
instituting suit was therefore put in issue. But was there any basis
for reaching the motive issue so quickly simply because the evi-
dence offered by plaintiff in support of his claim would be mostly
inadmissible and immaterial at trial? As will be seen, the answer
seems to be that Judge Carter's action was not inappropriate.
The case law contains little discussion of when a claim is or is
not unfounded for purposes of applying the bad faith exception.
When courts dispose of suits summarily, they often rest their find-
ings of lack of foundation simply on that summary disposition.
33
Because the motion for fees in Nemeroff followed a voluntary dis-
missal 34 without a decision on the merits, the court had to address
explicitly the basis of the complaint. Judge Carter ruled that the
claim was unfounded 5 due to the "insubstantial" 36 and inadmis-
sible 7 character of the plaintiff's evidence. Inasmuch as courts
commonly proceed to the issue of motive as soon as a claim or de-
fense has been disposed of by directed verdict or other summary
32 Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 639 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
33See, e.g., Gage v. Wexler, 82 F.R.D. 717 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Aid Auto
Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1975); Katz v. Delka Research
Corp. of N.J., 295 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Katz v. Amos
Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969). In Gage, "[t]he groundlessness of
plaintiff's suit is best demonstrated in the facts set forth in the Memorandum of
Opinion dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim." 82 F.R.D. at
718. Gage was a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k) (1976); according
to the standard articulated in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978), no finding of bad faith was required. See text accompanying notes 48-50
infra.
34 Below, this Comment proposes that, for reasons of judicial economy, a
voluntary dismissal should almost always automatically preclude a motion for
attorneys' fees. See text accompanying notes 112-16 infra. In the absence of
such a rule, the analysis offered here would apply.
35 Judge Carter described Nemeroff's claim as "baseless" because Nemeroff
did not have "one iota of proof-in the sense that term is defined in a court of
law." Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979). This choice of terms was unfortunate to
the extent that "baseless" implies that the plaintiff had not even a sincere sus-
picion of wrongdoing when he brought the suit. As will be discussed below, lack
of factual foundation is not tantamount to insincerity. See text accompanying
notes 39 & 66-68 infra. Indeed, the fatal flaw of the Nemeroff opinion is Judge
Carter's blurring of the evidentiary standard used in determining whether a claim
is unfounded with the state-of-mind standard which must be used to decide the
crucial question of bad faith. See text accompanying notes 40-56 infra.
36 Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 637 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
37 Id. 639.
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procedure, it was not inappropriate, in principle, for Judge Car-
ter to have reviewed Nemeroff's evidence using standards similar
to those used for summary judgment on the merits and to have
deemed the claim unfounded for purposes of applying the bad faith
exception: 38 a party should not be able to block further considera-
tion of a fee-shifting motion when his claim was grounded in cir-
cumstances, hearsay, gossip, and other inadmissible or inconclusive
evidence. Such evidence, however, may be probative of a party's
reasonable suspicions of wrongdoing, and as such, although not
sufficient to provide legal foundation for the claim, 39 relevant to a
determination of motive.
B. The Bad Faith Motive
Once a court has determined that a claim is unfounded,
another, more crucial, finding of fact is required if fees are to be
shifted. It is not enough that a party has brought a claim that is
totally without color: well-settled doctrine provides that the claim
must also have been "asserted wantonly, for purposes of harass-
ment or delay, or for other improper reasons." 40 Justice Brennan,
in the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the bad faith exception in
Hall v. Cole,41 observed that "[i]n this class of cases, the underlying
rationale of 'fee shifting' is, of course, punitive, and the essential
element in triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence
of 'bad faith' on the part of the unsuccessful litigant." 42
38 Motions for summary judgment must be decided on the basis of the admis-
sible evidence contained in the affidavits and other written submissions. FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(e). See, e.g., Munoz v. Int'l Alliance of Theater Stage Employees,
563 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1977); Hamilton v. Keystone Tankship Corp., 539 F.2d
684 (9th Cir. 1976); Daily Press, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 412 F.2d 126 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
39 See cases cited in note 33 supra.
40 Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d
Cir. 1977). In Browning, a Second Circuit panel limited the district court's award
of fees to "expenses reasonably incurred to meet the other party's groundless, bad
faith procedural moves." Expenses for the entire defense were not allowed be-
cause the action itself was not found to have been brought in bad faith. Id. 1089.
Procedures found to have been used in bad faith included the appeal of mooted
issues, delay for discovery never undertaken, service of dragnet subpoenas, and
threats to depose numerous officials of the defendant corporation. Id. 1088-89.
Although the need for a separate inquiry into motive is sometimes not as pro-
nounced in procedural bad faith cases as in cases involving allegedly bad faith
claims or defenses-because the court will have had an opportunity to observe the
behavior of the party opposing the motion-the standards for awarding fees are
the same, as Browning illustrates, and the same considerations of fairness to the
parties must be addressed. See notes 59-62 infra & accompanying text.
41412 U.S. 1 (1973).
42 Id. 5.
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Taken at face value, the Nemeroff opinion fully recognizes
the need to find actual malice, rather than merely lack of founda-
tion, in order to award fees .4  However, as noted earlier,44 the
court based its finding of bad faith almost exclusively on an evi-
dentiary standard: it inferred bad faith largely from the inadequacy
of the plaintiff's case, without focusing on independent, direct evi-
dence of actual malice. Although some such evidence was adduced
in the form of two affidavits suggesting that the original complaint
had been "leaked" to the press, the court devoted a mere paragraph
to this episode and accepted the truth of these critical affidavits
without testing their credibility or attempting to determine whether
the alleged leak had been intentional.45  Nemeroff is not unique
for its glib treatment of the motive issue,46 but, as will be demon-
strated below, such treatment is unfair to the parties. Procedures
for determining bad faith that deemphasize or completely omit
direct evidence of actual malice or willful disregard for the truth
undermine the subjective bad faith requirement. At the very least,
Nemeroff-type analyses create confusion in the law detrimental to
the proper disposition of fee-shifting motions under the exception.
For purposes of the bad faith exception, a litigant's behavior is
not measured by an objective "reasonable man" standard, as some
courts seem to imply.47 Rather, a court must make a subjective
determination of the litigant's state of mind at the time he pressed
his claim. The Supreme Court recently clarified this distinction in
Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,4 8 involving a defendant's
claim for fees under section 706 (k) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,49 which gives a court discretion to award attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party. Arguing that such discretion was to be
exercised solely in favor of plaintiffs who had served as "private
attorneys general," the plaintiff in Christianburg maintained that
43 Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 640 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
44 See text following note 17 supra.
45 Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979). See notes 102-05 infra & accompanying text.
46 See notes 57-62 & 68-71 infra & accompanying text.
47E.g., Aid Auto Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468, 471-72 (2d Cir. 1975)
("In short, although the evidence adduced at trial was plainly insufficient . . .
there were grounds for suspecting [defendant's] complicity, which entitled [plain-
tiff] Aid to institute the action with a view to discovering sufficient proof to enable
it to prove its charges at the time of trial."); Katz v. Delka Research Corp. of N.J.,
295 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Katz v. Amos Treat & Co.,
411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969).
48434 U.S. 412 (1978).
4942 U.S.C. §20O0e-5(k) (1976).
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the traditional bad faith standard should be applied when the
defendant moved for a fee award. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, reasoning that Congress would not have written an at-
torneys' fees clause into the statute if it had meant the courts to
continue applying the common law standard. 0 The Court thus
determined that use of the less restrictive objective test was appropri-
ate for awarding fees under the statute and, by implication, inap-
propriate under the traditional bad faith exception: "In sum, a
district court may in its discretion award attorneys' fees to a pre-
vailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plain-
tiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,
even though not brought in subjective bad faith." 
51
This "additional" subjective element of the common law bad
faith exception means that an "unreasonable man" can bring a
suit and not be taxed fees. Because state of mind is critical, the
central question in fee-shifting motions under the exception should
not be whether a party's suspicions were reasonable, but whether
he had sincere suspicions that he intended to substantiate by means
of the discovery process for the purpose of adjudicating a grievance
or asserting an affirmative defense. By inferring bad faith largely
from the plaintiff's lack of admissible evidence,52 Judge Carter con-
fused this distinction 53 in Nemeroff. His analysis may lead the
casual reader to think that because plaintiff's attorneys "should
have known that no hard facts but only rumor and gossip" 54 sup-
ported the charges, sufficient grounds existed to award fees. But
the test for awarding fees is whether the plaintiff and his attorney
50434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978).
511d. 421 (emphasis added). The Court's implied conclusion about the bad
faith exception is dictum, but the passage is not used here to show that a bad
motive is a prerequisite to common law fee shifting-Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1
(1973), established that. Rather, the passage is offered to illustrate the contrast
between the two modes of fee shifting.
52 See text following note 17 supra.
5sThe opinion states at the beginning of its determination of facts that
"[t]his lawsuit was instituted based on very strong convictions of wrongdoing, but
it was a conviction colored by greed." Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630,
635 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979). Judge
Carter apparently believed that Nemeroffs suspicions had been sincere, but that
he had been unable to realize the unreasonableness of his lawsuit because greed
had distorted his perceptions. An award of fees on this rationale is subject to
criticism. It is hard to imagine a person who could retain an air of complete
objectivity about what he considers a major grievance. Nemeroff could indeed
have been angered to the point where his suspicions might strike the detached
observer as unreasonable. If circumstances show that a particular plaintiff sin-
cerely believed wrongdoing had occurred and could be uncovered by discovery,
then fee shifting is inappropriate under the traditional bad faith exception.
54 Id. 640.
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actually did know their claim was unsupportable-not whether they
should have known it. At most, the objective unreasonableness of
a claim yields an inference or perhaps a prima facie case of bad
faith; 55 but the party pressing the claim should have an opportunity
to rebut and, if necessary, fully litigate the question of actual
malice.56
III. PROOF OF MOTIVE
A. Differing Views
Judge Carter is not the only judge to make a finding on motive
without seeking any direct, testimonial evidence on the actual state
of mind of the party opposing the attorneys' fees motion. In
Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,57 for example,
the plaintiff charged Humble with altering an evidentiary exhibit,
but after extensive discovery plaintiff's counsel conceded that there
was no basis for the accusation. A Fifth Circuit panel upheld the
award of fees to Humble under the bad faith exception even though
the award had not been based on any direct evidence of improper
motive.58
Similarly, several courts have awarded fees after inferring bad
faith from the dilatory or evasive actions of a party during trial
without having heard evidence bearing specifically on motive.59
The need for such a separate inquiry varies in these cases, depend-
ing upon the nature of the abuse and the opportunity for the court
to observe the behavior of the alleged abuser, but the standards for
55 Inferences, unlike presumptions, are based on logic, not rules of law. It is
not illogical to infer that, if a party presses a claim on the basis of an investiga-
tion that turned up no admissible supporting evidence, he may well be doing so
for a purpose other than the just adjudication of his grievance. See McCoPMIcK'S
HAinBooK OF THE LAw OF EvmENCE § 342, at 803-04 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972);
R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN, & K. CLERMONT, CrVIL POCEDUPE 497 (4th ed. 1978).
The effect of such an inference is to satisfy the movant's burden of production,
that is, to guarantee that the motion will be considered by the factfinder rather
than be dismissed out of hand for lack of support. The inferences that may be
drawn from the objective evidence will at times be so strong that the burden of
production will actually shift to the opposing party. In such cases, the opposing
party will lose the motion if he does not come forward with evidence to refute the
inference.
56 See text following note 121 infra.
5T441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
58Id. 636-37.
5 9 Examples other than those discussed in the text are Huecker v. Milbum, 538
F.2d 1241, 1246 & n.11 (6th Cir. 1976); First Natl Bank in Sioux Falls v. Dunham,
471 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973). In Dunham, although the bad faith exception was
not referred to by name, defendant's actions were so extremely offensive that the
court awarded fees for "dominating reasons of justice" relating to the defendant's
bad faith conduct. Id. 713.
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applying the bad faith exception are the same as in the claim-or-
defense cases and the concern with fairness to the parties is no less
appropriate. 60 Improper motive has been inferred in the pro-
cedural-abuse cases when, for example, after being informed by
the defendants and warned by the judge that all of the federal claims
in the complaint were facially deficient and barred by the statutes of
limitation, the plaintiff insisted on continuing the litigation.01
When, in another case, defendants continually denied facts well
known to all, forcing plaintiffs to spend a great deal of time and
money unnecessarily, the court shifted fees, citing the "purposeful
stratagem of delay for delay's sake." 62
The use of inferences as a basis for a fee award disadvantages
the party opposing the award who might desire and benefit from
the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence demonstrating his good
faith. Set against the weight of the cases that have foreclosed this
opportunity, however, are a pair of appellate opinions that deal with
taxing attorneys with costs on the basis of similar considerations:
These cases suggest in dictum that an evidentiary hearing in court
might have to be conducted on the issue of motive. The court in
Hanley v. Condrey,63 for instance, sidestepped the question whether
to assess costs against an attorney because it felt the amount of liti-
gation in the case was already excessive, but it noted along the
way that a decision to so assess costs might "require notice and a
hearing." 64 The court's conclusion was based on a Fifth Circuit
panel's decision in Miles v. Dickson 6 in which it was posited, also
in dictum, that to assess costs against attorneys without notice and
a hearing would be wrong. In light of attorneys' greater knowledge
of the law and the legal consequences of their actions, their clients
should be entitled to at least the same procedural safeguards in
fee-shifting motions.
10 See note 40 supra & references therein.
61 Gage v. Wexler, 82 F.R.D. 717 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
102 Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341, 345 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd in part, reo'd
in part, 559 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1977). In Gates, the district court awarded fees
incurred during trial only. The Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the award of trial fees
and reversed the lower court's refusal to award fees incurred in earlier appellate
proceedings. 559 F.2d 241.
683467 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1972).
64 Id. 700. The basis of the assessment of costs in Hanley was 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 (1976), which provides for awards against a person "who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously."
65387 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1967). The reason no costs were assessed in
Miles was that the attorneys had acted in "good faith." Id. 717. See generally
Satoskar v. Indiana Real Estate Comm'n, 517 F.2d 696 (7th Cir.) (question of
appeals taken in bad faith), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975); Walker v. Colum-
bia Broadcast. Sys., Inc., 443 F.2d 33, 38 (7th Cir. 1971).
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The party being taxed with fees is not the only party who
might desire the opportunity to present or discover evidence spe-
cifically relating to his subjective state of mind. It can happen that a
court will use an objective standard to infer that a claim was based
on reasonable suspicions and thus brought in good faith,66 whereas
the defendant 6 believes motive-related depositions or courtroom
cross-examination would reveal subjective bad faith. Those courts
that hold that bad faith cannot be inferred from a lack of factual
foundation when the plaintiff has heard or seen anything that could
reasonably lead him to suspect wrongdoing place the movant for
attorneys' fees in a difficult position-he must present additional,
direct evidence on motive if he is to prevail. Yet these opinions do
not address the basic problem that they raise: Should a party re-
questing attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception always be
allowed, when he makes his desire known to the court, to present
independent evidence specifically addressed to the motive issue?
At least one court has explicitly declined to order a hearing
under such circumstances. In Larchmont Engineering, Inc. v. Tog-
genburg Ski Center, Inc.,6 8 a Second Circuit panel inferred good
faith from the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal with prejudice and
affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' specific re-
quest to present evidence showing the plaintiff's bad faith. The
decision could be read narrowly as motivated by the court's over-
riding desire to encourage voluntary dismissals by granting such
plaintiffs a form of immunity 69-a policy which this Comment
approves. 70  However, the court's lack of enthusiasm for a motive-
related hearing in Larchmont may have reflected its attitude to-
ward all motions for attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception.
The judges spoke in broad terms of the need to rely on the trial
court's discretion in order that it "should not be straitjacketed by a
ruling that would have the effect of mandating a hearing." 71 The
66 See note 47 supra.
6 7 
In the interest of simplicity, and except in the context of particular decided
cases, "defendant" will be used to identify the party against whom a claim or
defense is raised; "plaintiff" will identify the party pressing the claim--the party
whose motive is at issue.
68444 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1971).
69Id. 491: "After pretrial discovery revealed the weaknesses of its claims,
Larchmont may well have decided in good faith to minimize litigation expense by
foregoing its claims and by taking a voluntary dismissal. Such a move should not
be discouraged by the threat of imposing attorneys fees." See note 112 infra.
70 See text accompanying notes 112-16 infra.
71 Larclmont Eng'r, Inc. v. Toggenburg Ski Center, 444 F.2d 490, 491 (2d
Cir. 1971).
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opinion left unclear, though, what, if anything, a trial judge should
consider in exercising his discretion.
At least one district court has attempted to establish an inter-
mediate procedure for determining whether a prima facie case for
award of fees has been established, thus necessitating further dis-
covery and possibly an adversary hearing72 Its solution was to
allow a "less costly presentation of written evidence"-a "quasi-
summary judgment" motion 73-in which an "extremely heavy
burden of proof" " would be imposed on the movant.
The dominant impression left by a survey of cases involving
the bad faith exception is that courts have been extremely reluctant
to set in motion litigation over the issue of subjective intent, even
though the American Rule with regard to attorneys' fees would
seem to require it, in the absence of a modifying statute.75 Analogy
to the long-established tort for malicious prosecution lends further
support to the view that parties in a fee-shifting dispute should be
granted an opportunity to present independent evidence of sub-
jective intent. At the same time, well-settled rules of summary
judgment offer a yardstick by which judges could fairly treat mo-
tions for "bad faith" attorneys' fees without necessitating a full-
blown trial in every case. This section therefore concludes with a
consideration of malicious prosecution and summary judgment and
their implications for fee-shifting under the "bad faith" exception.
B. A Comparison with Malicious Prosecution
The similarity between the bad faith exception to the American
Rule and the tort of malicious prosecution 6 is readily apparent:
liability for the tort is established only when the "prosecution" on
which the claim is based has terminated in favor of the defendant; 77
the alleged tortfeasor has been found to have brought the suit with-
out probable cause; 78 and the purpose of the suit has been found




75 See notes 50 & 51 supra & accompanying text.
7 6 On the subject of malicious prosecution, see generally Note, Groundless
Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 YALE
L.J. 1218 (1979); RESTA' M NT (SEco]1w) oF TonTs §674 (1977).
7 Cf. text accompanying note 23 supra (movant for fees must be "prevailing
party").
78 Cf. text accompanying notes 24-26 supra (opposing party's claim must have
been unfounded). Probable cause in malicious prosecution is a lenient concept:
the plaintiff need only reasonably believe in the existence of facts upon which to
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to have been other than to properly adjudicate a colorable claim.79
It should not be surprising, therefore, that several courts have sug-
gested that the standards for application of the bad faith exception
are similar to those for fixing liability for the tort.80 The Nemeroff
opinion itself states that "the standard involved is akin to that of
malicious prosecution." 81 Indeed, one court of appeals that prefers
the use of malicious prosecution suits to deter frivolous claims has
criticized fee-shifting motions because they "render a judgment
against [the plaintiff] for damages under the guise of fixing costs." s2
If, as these courts suggest, a request for attorneys' fees under
the bad faith exception is really a malicious prosecution suit in dis-
guise, one would expect the respondent's right to due process and
an evidentiary hearing to be the same in both contexts. In malicious
prosecution actions, the existence of probable cause for the under-
lying suit is usually determined by the judge as a matter of law.8s
Issues of fact relating to the question of motive, however, are aired
in adversary proceedings and submitted to the trier of fact unless
either side's evidence is simply incredible. The trier of fact may
infer improper purpose from the lack of probable cause,84 but the
base the claim and reasonably believe that on those facts the claim presents a
valid cause of action. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TozTs § 675 (1977). The
underlying policy here strongly resembles that behind the lack-of-foundation re-
quirement of the common law bad faith exception:
In many cases civil proceedings, to be effective, must be begun before
all of the relevant facts can be ascertained to a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty. To put the initiator of civil proceedings to a greater risk of lia-
bility would put an undesirable burden upon those whose rights cannot
be otherwise effectively enforced.
Id. comment d at 459.
79 Cf. text accompanying note 27 supra (opposing party's claim must have been
brought for improper purpose). Examples of improper purpose include the desires
to deprive the defendant of the beneficial use of his property or to force a settle-
ment that has no relation to the merits of the claim. RESTATEMNT (SEcoN) OF
ToRTs § 676, comment c at 462-63 (1977). Dean Prosser observes that findings
of malice have been made in suits begun for any purpose other than adjudication
of the claim in suit. W. PaossEB, LAw OF TORTS § 120, at 855 (4th ed. 1971).
The three requirements listed in the text have been recognized and have
remained constant for more than a century. See Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S.
197 (1878). In some states the English rule is followed, and a fourth requirement
is imposed: that the defendant have suffered special damage. See Note, supra
note 76, at 1220.
80 See, e.g., Smoot v. Fox, 353 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1965); Lawrence v. Fuld,
32 F.R.D. 329, 332 (D. Md. 1963).
81 Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 640 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 73-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
8 2 Smoot v. Fox, 353 F.2d 830, 832 (6th Cir. 1965).
83 See Note, supra note 76, at 1235 n.116.
84 See W. PNosszn, LAw OF TORTS § 119, at 849, § 120, at 855 (4th ed. 1971).
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defendant will have had the opportunity to overcome any such
inference by presenting evidence that shows that he did not file
the suit with the requisite bad intents 5
An evidentiary hearing in court appears to be no less necessary
when the court is asked to award attorneys' fees.86 There is no
reason that a judge deciding a fee-shifting motion cannot likewise
draw an initial inference of improper motive from the circum-
stances of the filing of a claim or from the probative value of the
evidence that the opposing party had marshaled by the time the
claim was disposed of summarily.87 A court should be wary of
treating that inference as "all but irrebuttable," 88 however, and
should at most merely shift to the opposing party the burden of
producing some evidence of his subjective good faith. 9
C. The Lessons of Summary Judgment
To say that a fee-shifting motion is akin to a suit for malicious
prosecution is not to say that every such motion must be tried
in open court. Summary proceedings, modeled on the well-tested
practice on motions for summary judgment,90 may be appropriate
in some cases. Once the threshold finding that the claim or defense
was unfounded was made, the parties would be given time for
discovery relating to the issue of plaintiff's good faith. As in sum-
mary judgment proceedings, each party would then submit to the
court affidavits, depositions, and other written evidence probative
of motive.91 If, upon an evidendary hearing, no genuine issue of
material fact was raised,92 a summary disposition could be made.
If a dispute was clearly present, an adversary hearing would be held
at which oral testimony would be taken, witnesses would be subject
to cross-examination, and the judge would have the opportunity to
85 Id. 849.
86 Because the court's power to award fees under the bad faith exception is
classified as equitable, the party opposing the award has no clear right to a jury
trial. All that is contended here is that a judge's factfinding mission in the fee-
shifting and malicious prosecution contexts is one and the same and should be
accomplished by means of an evidentiary hearing and, if necessary, oral testimony
subject to cross-examination.
87 See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
88 Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
s9 See note 55 supra.
90 See FzD. R. Civ. P. 56.
91 Compare this procedure with the treatment of motive in the cases dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 57-62 & 68-71 supra.
92 Pn. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Poller v. Columbia Broadcast. Sys., Inc., 368
U.S. 464 (1961).
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observe the demeanor and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.93
Such a proceeding might put the parties and the court to greater
time and expense than does current practice, but as long as sub-
jective bad faith remains a prerequisite of an award of attorneys'
fees, judges will not always be able to base their decisions on writ-
ten evidence alone.
Two caveats, in the form of well-established principles of sum-
mary judgment practice, must be noted in connection with the pro-
posal. First, if a motion for summary judgment requires the judge
to assess the relative credibility of the parties' witnesses or exhibits
without the benefit of cross-examination, then the motion should
usually be denied. 94 Accordingly, summary disposition of fee-shift-
ing motions frequently may be inappropriate, because a finding of
motive often must be based on a judgment about the relative cred-
ibility of the parties. In practical terms, the propriety of sum-
mary proceedings may depend on the kind of evidence offered to
the court. When the only evidence supplied is in the form of affi-
davits, summary disposition is probably unsuitable.95 On the other
hand, the evidentiary benefit of cross-examination is preserved
when the court is provided with detailed depositions; 96 if, on the
basis of such depositions, the judge determines that the opposing
party's argument is simply incredible, a summary award of fees to
the movant may be made.9
7
Because the facts relevant to motive are often within the per-
sonal knowledge of the party opposing the award, the movant for
fees may benefit from a deposition or trial-like proceeding. 98 In
93 See generally 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTCE f 56.15[41 (2d ed. 1979).
94 See Poller v. Columbia Broadcast. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1961)
("It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that
their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised.
Trial by affidavits is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the
hallmark of 'even handed justice."'); see also 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PACT-nCE
I56.15[41, at 56-519 (2d ed. 1979).
95 See Poller v. Columbia Broadcast. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1961); 6
MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC-TCE ff 56.15[4], at 56-514 (2d ed. 1979).
9 6 See Miles v. Dickson, 40 F.R.D. 386, af'd in part, re'd in part on other
grounds, 387 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1967); Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United
States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943); see also 6 MooRE's FEDEanr PRACTICE
If 56.15[4], at 56-513 (2d ed. 1979).
97 Compare an oft-quoted test for determining when summary judgment may
be granted: in Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 306 (5th Cir. 1940), the
court said that a party could win on summary judgment if the opposing party's
"tendered evidence is in its nature too incredible to be accepted by reasonable
minds."
9
8 When the motive of procedural tactics during trial is at issue, access to
proof is less likely to be a problem. See note 40 & accompanying text.
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the summary judgment context, this "access to proof" problem has
given rise to the general rule-our second caveat-that anything
less than a trial-like proceeding "is particularly inappropriate where
the inferences which the parties seek to have drawn deal with ques-
tions of motive, intent, and subjective feelings and reactions." 91
Considerations of judicial economy dictate that this principle not
be carried to extremes. Summary disposition may still be appro-
priate against a movant who utterly fails to produce any affirmative
evidence of the opposing party's bad faith in the face of the latter's
assertions of nonmalicious error.100
In short, although summary judgment often will not be appro-
priate, courts should be sure that a fee-shifting "trial" is necessary
before ordering one, for the prospect of such a lengthy proceeding
may have the effect of deterring both potentially meritorious claims
and potentially justifiable requests for fees.
C. Nemeroff Reexamined
The foregoing sections probe some of the procedural impli-
cations of making subjective bad faith a prerequisite for the equita-
ble award of attorneys' fees. Against this background, the flaws in
Judge Carter's treatment of the fee-shifting motion in Nemeroff v.
Abelson 10- are evident. The defendants in Nemeroff were awarded
fees even though their allegations of improper motive had been
99 Cross v. United States, 336 F.2d 431, 433 (2d Cir. 1964) (quoting Empire
Elec. Co. v. United States, 311 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1962)); accord, Poller
v. Columbia Broadcast. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
100 Summary judgment practice in libel actions by public figures is a useful
analogue. For just as the exercise of first amendment rights might be chilled if
harsh sanctions were imposed in such libel suits for mere negligence, so use of
the courts might be deterred if negligence were the standard for award of fees.
In fact, a showing of actual malice is central to both those libel actions and mo-
tions for fees. As Judge Carter himself noted, a groundless suit has the same
potential for damage to a person's reputation as does a defamatory statement.
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 640 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No.
79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
It is difficult, but not impossible, for the plaintiff in a public-figure libel suit
to survive a motion for summary judgment. See T. EMERSON, D. HmaA, & N.
DoRsEN, Po.cAv . AND CrvrL RhGnTs IN = UNITED STATES 518-19 (4th ed.
1976). A recent decision of the Supreme Court, in Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct.
1635 (1979), serves to underscore the importance of the opportunity to inquire
directly into the state of mind of the opponent before a motion for summary judg-
ment is entertained. In Lando, the Court held that even the first amendment did
not shelter publishing defendants from court-ordered compulsory discovery into
their state of mind at the time of publication of the statement in question. By
analogy, in fee-shifting motions the interest in not inhibiting potentially meri-
torious lawsuits should not be held to preclude movants for fees from cross-examin-
ing their opponents, either in deposition proceedings or in full hearings.
101469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May
25, 1979).
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disputed by the plaintiff-a genuine issue of material fact had been
raised. Yet it is at best unclear from Judge Carter's opinion whether
the parties treated the hearing that was held as an evidentiary one
focusing on the plaintiff's state of mind. For instance, neither party
devoted much attention to the question whether the complaint had
been intentionally leaked to the press before it was filed.1.0 2  Judge
Carter, however, attached great significance to this question, and
so should have resolved it on the basis of examination and cross-
examination of those involved. Instead, his conclusion that the
plaintiff had leaked the complaint deliberately 103 and maliciously 104
was drawn solely from the affidavits of two interested parties-a
defendant and his employee. 105 The judge thus apparently dis-
credited the plaintiff's sworn affidavits of good faith without the
caution usually observed in deciding issues of credibility and ques-
tions of motive. Other factual disputes that should have been
resolved through depositions or in open court concerned the con-
1o2 Defendant Abelson's memorandum of law refers to this fact only once, in
its introductory statement of facts. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Costs and Expenses Including Reasonable Attorneys' Fees at 12,
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366
(2d Cir. May 25, 1979). The contents of plaintiffs memorandum were discussed
over the telephone with Nemeroffs attorneys.
'03 Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979): "[T]he wide dissemination of the damaging
allegations [was] done with conscious deliberation. The evident purpose was to
secure maximum publicity harmful to the publishing defendants."
104 Id. 636: "The [decision] ... to supply copies of the pleadings to the press
even before the complaint was actually filed severely compromisets] [plaintiff's]
assertions of good faith."
105 See Brief for Appellants at 28, Nemeroff v. Abelson, No. 79-7366 (2d
Cir. May 25, 1979).
Judge Carter's one-sided discussion of this incident illustrates clearly the
need in this case for an evidentiary hearing to test the truth of these affidavits.
Drawing from them, the opinion states:
On the day the suit was fied . . .a newspaper reporter telephoned
Barror's to speak to Abelson. . . . Bleiberg [the editor] returned the
call and was told that [the reporter] had a copy of the complaint and
wanted to talk about it. Bleiberg then sent an office assistant to the
courthouse to be told that no such complaint had been filed. Later, he
obtained a copy and the clerk's notation indicates that the complaint was
filed at 3:38 P.M.
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No.
79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979). Beyond this circumstantial evidence, Judge
Carter did not recite-and the affidavits did not supply--any facts indicating that
the plaintiff's attorneys had intentionally "leaked" the complaint before filing in
order to obtain maximum publicity adverse to the publishing defendants. Neme-
rows attorneys, on the other hand, have advanced a plausible explanation for the
incident: in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case, a reporter
with the newspaper that obtained the complaint had been interviewed because he
had written articles containing similar allegations about Abelson's activities. Brief
for Appellants at 29, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
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tent and nature of various conversations 06 and the reasons Neme-
roff dropped the suit '107--the latter being of undoubted significance
for a finding on the bad faith issue.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A. Procedures for Consideration of Motive-Related Evidence
This Comment has established that courts award attorneys'
fees in a variety of ways according to strikingly different interpreta-
tions of traditional standards. Nemeroff v. Abelson 108 suggests a
new readiness to impute bad faith to a litigant when it appears
that he has no solid admissible evidence upon which to base his
claim or defense. In some earlier cases, on the other hand, courts
strained to find that the litigant had "reasonable suspicions" upon
which to base his claim and from which the court could infer good
faith. 10 9 This variation in the application of the bad faith exception
makes it extremely difficult to predict whether attorneys' fees will
be awarded in a given case. The consequence is a deterrent effect.
A person with a good faith complaint but little or no solid factual
evidence to support it may be advised not to litigate the claim; a
defendant who knows he has been taken to court in bad faith may
choose to settle rather than risk being unable to recover his litiga-
tion expenses.
In order to eliminate both this unwarranted deterrent and the
risk that a good faith claimant will be penalized and stigmatized on
the basis of unsubstantiated judicial inferences, courts should adopt
uniform procedures that are fair to the parties. These procedures
should reflect both the close similarity between fee-shifting motions
and malicious prosecution suits 110 and also the desirability of avoid-
ing expensive full-scale proceedings when one party's evidence is
3
0 6 See Brief for Appellants at 21, Nemeroff v. Abeson, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir.
May 25, 1979).
107 The opinion states that the plaintiff's suit completely collapsed. Nemeroff
v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 632-33 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366
(2d Cir. May 25, 1979). The plaintiff's attorneys, however, contend that the suit
was dropped for reasons unrelated to the claim's merits: "[H]e decided the finan-
cial and personal burdens of continuing the litigation were too great." Brief for
Appellants at 32, Nemeroff v. Abelson, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
Among these burdens were attacks launched against Nemeroff by Abelson in his
widely read and influential column. Id. 31-32.
108 469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir.
May 25, 1979).
109 See note 66 supra & accompanying text.
110 See notes 76-89 supra & accompanying text.
1979]
488 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
either so insubstantial or incredible that summary disposition is
appropriate."'
Fairness to the parties, however, is not the only consideration
that must shape the procedures used in applying the bad faith
exception. The interest in judicial efficiency must also be served.
For example, the judicial policy of favoring voluntary dismissals of
actions suggests that plaintiffs who take that step generally ought
not risk punishment through an award of attorneys' fees to defend-
ants.112  Rather than "straitjacketing" 113 a court by mandating a
hearing in such circumstances, the law should impose upon the de-
fendant seeking fees an extremely heavy burden of proof: unless
he can establish a prima facie case of bad faith through written
evidence, the motion for award of fees should be summarily dis-
missed.114 Although the analogy to summary judgment procedure
cautions against depriving the movant of an opportunity to try the
issue of intent,115 the expense and time of the proceedings, com-
bined with the reluctance to "punish" voluntary dismissals,116 tips
the scales toward denial of movants' requests for such hearings.
But if a prima facie case of bad faith is established, as perhaps in
Nemeroff, fairness requires that the opposing party be afforded the
same opportunity to prove his good faith as if the claim or defense
had been dismissed at a later stage.
117
When the motion for attorneys' fees is made at a later stage-
for instance, after the opposing party has suffered defeat on sum-
mary judgment or directed verdict-the countervailing efficiency
interest in encouraging voluntary dismissals is missing and the argu-
11" See text accompanying notes 97 & 100 & following note 100 infra.
112 The general rule is that "[aibsent a showing of exceptional circumstances,
an award to defendant of costs and attorney's fees is improper where plaintiff
obtains a voluntary dismissal with prejudice." 5 Mooi's FEnEmAL PRACTnCE
If 41.06 n.5, at 41-86 to -87 (2d ed. 1979) (citing, e.g., Mobile Power Enterprises,
Inc. v. Power Vac, Inc., 496 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1974); Smoot v. Fox, 353
F.2d 830 (6th Cir. (1965)). See Larchmont Eng'r, Inc. v. Toggenburg Ski Center,
Inc., 444 F.2d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 1971): "[Pilaintiff may well have decided in
good faith to minimize litigation expense by foregoing its claims and by taking a
voluntary dismissal. Such a move should not be discouraged by the threat of
imposing attorney fees."
11" Larchmont Eng'r, Inc. v. Toggenburg Ski Center, 444 F.2d 490, 491 (2d
Cir. 1971).
114 See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Oak Materials Group, Inc., 424
F. Supp. 700, 702-03 (D. Del. 1976).
115 See notes 98-100 supra & accompanying text.
116 See notes 112 supra.
117 This is consistent with procedure in malicious prosecution suits. See note
85 supra & accompanying text.
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ments for promoting procedural fairness become compelling.118
Evidence relating to motive must be heard if courts are to award
sizable 119 fees as punishment12 0 for bad faith litigation. The fol-
lowing scheme is proposed as a means of accommodating the fre-
quently competing goals of fairness and economy in the disposition
of motions under the bad faith exception.
121
After a summary disposition of the plaintiff's claim, 22 a re-
buttable inference of plaintiff's bad faith may be derived from cir-
cumstances surrounding the claim, such as the absence of any dis-
puted facts, colorable question of law, or admissible evidence. Any
depositions, admissions, or other exhibits demonstrating the alleged
improper purpose of the claim may be introduced along with a
brief or memorandum supporting the fee-shifting motion. The
movant having thus satisfied his burden of production, his op-
ponent then has an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence in the
form of a brief and supporting depositions or affidavits. Obviously,
the opposing party should not simply assert his good faith, but
should recount whatever sincere suspicions motivated the claim or
defense, chronicle any efforts made to verify it, and describe the
ultimately fruitless strategy of discovery or investigation by which
he had hoped to document his suspicions. Unless rebuttal evidence
is not forthcoming or is thoroughly incredible, the judge will then
compare the parties' evidence to determine whether genuine issues
of fact are raised. If they are, the party bearing the ultimate burden
of persuasion-the movant-must choose whether or not he wishes
to pursue the matter further through a trial-like hearing. Because
the issue in controversy involves motive and subjective intent, the
movant's request for such a hearing should be honored. If he de-
cides not to go to that added expense, the matter is ended. If a
hearing is requested and held, the interests of both parties are
118 For an argument that measures to ensure procedural fairness in such cases
actually enhance judicial efficiency, see text accompanying notes 123-26 infra.
119 Judge Carter awarded $50,000 in Nemeroff, and that case was dismissed
at a relatively early stage. Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 642 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
120 See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
121 The author wishes to thank Robert Aronson, Visiting Associate Professor of
Law at the University of Pennsylvania, for his valuable advice in the preparation
of this proposal.
22 As was discussed in the text accompanying note 33 supra, such dispositions
provide the basis for findings that the first two prerequisites for a fee award under
the bad faith exception-movant as prevailing party and lack of foundation of
opposing party's claim-have been met. This proposal is therefore addressed only
to the third element-bad faith.
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served because the court will be deciding the issues not solely on
the basis of paper evidence but also on the testimony of witnesses
subject to cross-examination.
The objection that additional evidentiary hearings will con-
sume already scarce judicial resources ignores not only the dictates
of fairness, but also the possibility that such hearings may have the
net effect of increasing judicial efficiency. When the trial judge
disposes of a fee-shifting motion without benefit of an evidentiary
hearing, a losing party's argument for de novo review of the facts
by an appellate court 123 will be stronger than if the trial judge had
heard testimony and thus had been in a superior position to evalu-
ate credibility. Lacking a justification for deference to the lower
court's finding of facts, the appellate court may end up having to
duplicate the trial court's examination of exhibits and affidavits. 124
And, of course, the same argument applies when the trial court
has not even considered any written evidence related directly to
motive.125 In this latter case, the appellate court does not duplicate
the trial court's efforts; rather it takes time away from the perform-
ance of its usual appellate function to make initial findings of fact.
126
The analysis above shows that explicit consideration of motive-
related evidence is necessary if fees are to be awarded fairly under
the bad faith exception. For reasons of judicial economy, however,
courts may be reluctant to expend the additional resources neces-
sary to make the finding of motive properly. Judge Carter showed
no inclination to prolong the Nemeroff litigation in order to con-
sider evidence directly related to motive, even though the size of
123 Nemeroff's attorneys have made such an argument in their brief to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Brief for Appellants at 35, Nemeroff v. Abelson,
No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25, 1979).
124 See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d
1078 (2d Cir. 1977); Aid Auto Stores v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1975).
125 But compare Larehmont Eng'r, Inc. v. Toggenburg Ski Center, Inc., 444
F.2d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the court upheld a trial judge's denial of
a defendant's requests for attorneys' fees and for an evidentiary hearing on the
question of the plaintiff's bad faith. The appeals court declined to disturb the
judge's decision and announced that "[t]he question is peculiarly one within the
discretion of the Nisi Prius judge who in this case was more familiar than we are
with the claims and with the likelihood of defendants' establishing bad faith." Id.
491. Larchmont can, however, be read more narrowly as applying only to cases
in which the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his claim. See text accompanying notes
69-71 supra.
126 Deference to a trial judge's findings may be more appropriate when at-
torneys' fees are awarded because of a party's procedural bad faith (e.g., hap-
hazard discovery, dilatory tactics, or service of dragnet subpoenas; see note 40
supra). In these cases, the lower court will have been in a superior position to
evaluate the tactics of the opposing counsel.
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the attorneys' fees at issue was quite considerable.12T In light of the
widespread concern over congestion in the courts 128 and the related
problem of unfounded litigation, it is important that courts resist
the urge to award fees quickly without due regard for procedural
fairness. Indeed, the chance that huge sums of money will be at
stake makes fairness in motions for attorneys' fees that much more
essential.
B. Do the Critics of the American Rule Have a Point ?
Perhaps the foregoing exposition of proper practice under the
bad faith exception adds weight to the argument that the American
Rule for awarding attorneys' fees is inefficient.129 Various critics
of the rule have advanced proposals for making the award of fees
contingent on more objective factors.'8 0 Because it is the criterion
of motive which necessitates the additional litigation of fee-shifting
motions, one way to increase efficiency is simply to eliminate motive
as an issue. Fees could be shifted whenever the court was con-
vinced the claim was unfounded,13 1 regardless of whether it was
brought for an improper purpose. Such a wholesale modification
of the American Rule, the Supreme Court has said, 32 can be
adopted only by Congress. In fact, Congress has already changed
the rule in specific categories of litigation, such as suits under the
1964 Civil Rights Act. 3 3  With extension of the rule to all classes
of litigation would have to come a change in philosophy. No longer
would punishment be the paramount goal; 134 rather, the emphasis
127 Judge Carter awarded $50,000 to the publishing defendants. They actu-
ally incurred over $100,000 in fees and expenses, but the judge concluded that
"an award of part of these expenditures seems to me sufficient." Nemeroff v.
Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 642 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (2d
Cir. May 25, 1979).
128 See note I supra & accompanying text.
129 See note 5 supra.
130 See, e.g., Eh-zenweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 26 CAL. ST. B.J.
107, 107-09 (1951) (universal indemnification); Manse, Winner Takes All: A
Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. Buv. 26, 48 (1969) (fees
awarded according to reasonable probability of claim's success); Comment, Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, supra note 3, at 652-55
(legislative enactment of method to shift fees in "unreasonable" suits); Note, supra
note 76, at 1232-37 (lack of probable cause).
131 Cases that involve dismissals for failure to state a claim under current law
may merit separate treatment. See note 137 infra & accompanying text.
132 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262, 271
(1975).
18342 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(k) (1976). See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412 (1978).
134 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1972); text accompanying note 42 supra.
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would be on compensating parties who have been forced to resist
unsubstantiated or otherwise improper claims or defenses.
In concrete terms, the rule would work in the following man-
ner. Reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with any
claim or defense that was disposed of summarily for lack of factual
support would be paid by the losing party. Compensation would
not be ordered simply because the suit, when filed, was not based
on any admissible evidence; rather, fees would be assessed on the
basis of the outcome of summary disposition because, before a mo-
tion for summary disposition is considered, a litigant is afforded a
reasonable time to document his claim through discovery. 135 Thus,
compensation for attorneys' fees would be ordered only when a
party had instituted a suit with no solid evidentiary support, had
not been able to document his claim through the discovery process,
and had not chosen to dismiss it voluntarily' 3 6 before the court
ruled on a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict.
Fees would not be shifted when, on the stipulated facts, the
loser's claim was not valid under current law. This distinction
between lack of factual and legal basis of the claim is necessary to
ensure the continued development of the law through consideration
of claims based on suggested reforms.13 7
This objective compensatory scheme is not necessarily better
than the procedure suggested above for hearing motive-related
evidence under the bad faith exception. Each reflects a different
philosophy of fee shifting. Both would help deter groundless liti-
gation. Either is superior to the current practice of punitive fee
shifting improperly administered without presentation of evidence
relating to motive.
135 See 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTCE f 56.02[8], at 56-38, ir 56.1516], at
56-608 (2d ed. 1979); note 100 supra.
13 6 See notes 112-16 supra & accompanying text.
13 7 The ABA CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPONSmIL=Y supports the view that
such claims should not be discouraged. Id. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(3) pro-
vides that "a lawyer shall not knowingly advance a claim or defense that is un-
warranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense
if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law."
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